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common carrier, subject to the rules of the railroad commission."
"That's what I'm trying to do," said Juan, "and one of the
rules of the commission is don't kill the passengers."
-- John Steinbeck,
The Wayward Bus, p.137
I. INTRODUCTION
Ships have launched a thousand tales and the railroad train
has inspired nostalgia, romance, mystery, folk song and melo-
drama. Even the over-the-road truck has given birth to the entire
genre of country and western ballad. No movie of life among the
glamorous rich would be complete without the obligatory scenes of
dashing jet planes and handsome crews. No comparable literary
tribute has arisen to the intercity bus, despite the fact of its ubiq-
uity in modern life. Buses serve more communities than airplanes
and Amtrak combined, are part of the national experience (every-
one has been, if not an intercity bus passenger, at least a rider on a
school charter) and are often the only link a small city has with the
outside world. Perhaps a certain amount of opprobrium has at-
tached to what has become regarded as the poor man's intercity
transportation, and so its literary celebration is limited.
II. THE RISE OF INTERCITY Bus LiNEs
The growth of the bus industry is rather different from the
history of trucking. The industry is passenger-oriented and has de-
veloped into a duopoly, with Greyhound and Trailways the pre-
dominant operators. The Greyhound system began in the Iron
Range of Minnesota in the 1920's, and expanded through merger
with other bus lines until a nation-wide system was formed. Until
recently, Trailways was a loose association of once-independent
bus lines and many former railroad subsidiaries. Protected from
antitrust considerations by law and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission policy, the two were allowed to expand to the extent where
they have national preeminence today, with a mere differentiated
fringe of local operators. Railroad companies, seeking a solution to
the problem of passenger operations, once bought heavily into bus
companies, but most sold their interests to Greyhound or Trail-
ways.1 Some independent companies have flourished, mostly in the
1. Until recently Bangor & Aroonstook was one of the few railroads that still
operated its own bus company. However, in January, 1984, the I.C.C. allowed for
[Vol. 6:75
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Midwest and Southeast, but most operate as feeders with some af-
filiation with one or the other national systems.
Bus companies provide a low-cost, labor-efficient, fuel-efficient
system of transportation that unfortunately reached its peak in the
early 1970's and is fighting to hold on to its share of the market
today. By using public highways for transport, and by using very
rudimentary terminals (except in major cities), the bus companies
have been able to avoid the costly infrastructure that long plagued
railroad passenger service. There were low costs and fast deprecia-
tion in the industry, since the major expenses were buses and the
cost of drivers. Somehow, the Amalgamated Transit Union and
other labor organizations were persuaded to allow the driver to do
loading and unloading work en route and thus station costs were
minimized. Except for major cities, the bus depot was an agency
station, located in a drug store or gas station, with the agent col-
lecting a commission for bus tickets sold. Development of a long-
distance motor coach by General Motors (with the engine under-
neath the passenger compartment and room for baggage to boot)
and the increasing mileage of all-weather highways supplied by the
taxpayer gave opportunities for the industry to grow.
For all the advantages, bus travel never achieved its full po-
tential in the United States. Vehicles were often cramped and
crowded, unlike the more luxurious European coaches. Bus compa-
nies, writing off the luxury market, concentrated on cheap trans-
portation and neglected many amenities. A system of mail buses,
such as provides services to German small towns, never developed
in this country, and most small communities have no access to in-
tercity buses. Worst of all, the bus industry, unwilling to short-
haul itself, never moved toward a system of intermodal transporta-
tion. It is very difficult to switch from bus to rail or bus to air
modes in this country, although most other nations regard all
transport as part of an integral system, with intermodal terminals
in the centres of cities.
Today's intercity bus companies derive much of their earnings
from charter service or package express. On many carriers, the in-
tercity carriage of passengers is a marginal activity, maintained to
keep the franchise.
The bus industry, like the trucking industry, has greatly
benefitted from the development of the interstate system of super-
highways, which allowed it to compete with and sometimes surpass
the discontinuance of this bus service. TRAINS, March 1984 at _.
1984]
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the speed of passenger trains. The decline of rail passenger service
and its curtailment with the institution of Amtrak in 19712 left
many communities totally reliant on buses for passenger transpor-
tation, yet bus revenues did not appreciably increase during the
1970's. Presumably, the former rail passengers now drive or take
the plane.
III. THE CALL FOR REGULATION
Up until 1925, motor carriers, if they were regulated at all
were totally under state control (very much like the system of pro-
vincial control which now exists). Carriers operating in different
states had to obtain authority from each jurisdiction through
which they passed (they still must obtain license plates today).
This system of state regulation was drastically changed by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Buck v. Kuykendall.4 This case
involved a motor carrier who applied to the state of Washington
for authority to operate between Seattle and Portland. The appli-
cation was denied, with Washington's regulatory commission stat-
ing that there was already adequate rail and highway service be-
tween the two cities.
The Supreme Court, on appeal, held that such a denial was
beyond the authority of the state of Washington. Inasmuch as the
trucks crossed the Columbia River into Oregon, they were operat-
ing in interstate commerce. Constitutionally, a state could not for-
bid, limit or prohibit competition in interstate commerce. (At the
time the state of Oregon was willing to grant Buck authority to
operate in that state).
The effect of Buck was to wipe out state controls on entry for
motor carriers and to limit state regulation of interstate service to
historic police power areas of motor vehicle safety and highway
conservation.5 At the time of the Buck decision, some forty states
required operators of trucks to obtain certificates of public conve-
nience and necessity, regardless of whether they operated in inter-
state or intrastate commerce. The Buck decision impelled efforts
to seek a federal solution to the problem of the regulation of inter-
2. See Thorns, Clear Track for Deregulation, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 183, 196-200
(1982).
3. Motor Vehicle Transport Act, Section 3.2 (1954) (See Can. Stat.).
4. 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
5. Webb, Legislative and Regulatory History of Entry Controls on Motor
Carriers of Passengers, 8 TRmsP. L.J. 91, 93 (1976).
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state motor carriage. The Interstate Commerce Commission al-
ready exerted plenary powers over the operations of railroads. It
was logical that Congress should look to that body for the expertise
necessary to regulate this new form of transportation.
The rationale which advocates of regulation stressed included
several arguments which favored continuity of service over compe-
tition. Unlike the financial barriers to entry into the railroad in-
dustry, such as construction costs, there were few financial barriers
to entry into the trucking business. During the depression years,
an unemployed bus owner might drive just for gas money, or to
make payments on the bus. When the inevitable happened and the
bus needed repairs, the driver might withdraw from the market,
but another operator would be there to take his place. This cut-
rate transportation was a threat to established bus lines and rail-
roads alike.
The reasons for justifying entry controls were given in the fol-
lowing order of importance.
A. Prevention of an Oversupply of Transportation
ICC Commissioner Eastman stated in hearings before the Sen-
ate Interstate Commerce Committee in 1935:
The most important thing, I think, is the prevention of an
oversupply of transportation in other words, an oversupply which
will sap and weaken the transportation system rather than
strengthen it. In the case of railroads that was done in 1920 by
the provision that prior to any new construction a certificate of
convenience and necessity must be secured from the Commission.
In my judgment it would have been much better if there had been
such a provision many years before. It would have prevented cer-
tain railroad construction which tends to weaken the railroad sys-
tem and situation at the present time. The States have, I think,
in all cases, found the necessity in their regulation of motor trans-
portation to provide for that prevention of an oversupply. It is a
provision which has been adopted in most of the foreign countries
that I have inquired into; in other words, the granting of certifi-
cates or permits in order to prevent an oversupply which weakens
the situation.6
In other words, many experts held the belief that if too many
motor carriers competed on the same route, the situation would
6. Hearings on S. 1629, S. 1632, and S. 1635 Before the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
19841
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arise where no one could make any money out of the service. It was
this rationale which caused the ICC, for 45 years, to protect incum-
bent carriers against new competitors.
B. Equality of Regulation
At this time, railroads were fully regulated. It was thought to
be unfair to continue this regulation while the motor carriers, oper-
ating on parallel and competing routes, would be unregulated. In
addition, intrastate carriers were regulated by the individual
states; it seemed unfair to allow the owner of a bus which crossed a
state line to be able to disregard state law.'
C. Interdependence of Entry Controls and Enforcement
Suspension of revocation of a carrier's license is a useful en-
forcement tool. Thus, most of the studies prior to 1935 which dealt
with regulation assumed that control of entry would be part of the
system. Most states operated on such a regulatory scheme.
Interestingly, most of the concern voiced by Congress was
about bus operators. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 required bro-
kers of passenger transportation to deal only with certified carriers.
The ICC had found in a 1928 report that although intercity bus
service was generally satisfactory, so-called "wildcatters" were cut-
ting fares below compensatory levels and otherwise engaging in
reprehensible practices." Federal regulation was supposed to end
such practices but no thought was given to whether or not such
entry control was necessary for the prevention of these practices.
Utility-type regulation was thus adopted for an industry which
had few of the characteristics of a natural monopoly. Continuity of
service was one lauded characteristic. The bus rider would rather
have the certainty of having the Greyhound every day at a fixed
schedule than have rate competition but uncertain service. Small
towns would prefer to have a guarantee of service by a single car-
rier than sporadic competitive efforts by a number of struggling
operations. Motor carriers should be sufficiently solvent to pay
claims or fix up their equipment.
Furthermore, in 1935 free and unbridled competition with the
freedom to run a competitor out of business had a bad name. The
New Deal had made an effort to cartelize industry through the Na-
7. Webb, supra note 5, at 93.
8. Motor Bus and Truck Operations, 140 I.C.C. 685, 702 (1928).
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tional Recovery Act. The failure of the Blue Eagle to meet Consti-
tutional norms9 still did not diminish the faith and enthusiasm for
government regulation to support prices and buttress the economy.
Provisions of a safe and solvent highway transportation system was
considered to be a complement to regulation of railways and city
transit systems. The ICC, with 50 years of expertise in transporta-
tion regulation, was considered just the body to do the job.
IV. THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1935
Enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 193510 more than
doubled the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and changed its focus from a railroad agency to one concerned with
all surface transportation." As an umbrella agency, the Commis-
sion was charged with protecting not only the public but the eco-
nomic existence of rail, motor and water carriers.
Those individuals and firms lucky enough to be operating
buses on the highways at the time of enactment of the Motor Car-
rier Act were grandfathered into certificates and protected from
further competition. Otherwise, carriers had to run the gauntlet of
ICC procedures in order to obtain authority that would allow them
to haul for hire. Trucks and buses were considered under the same
regulatory scheme, and a similar regime was adopted for the entry
of air carriers in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.12
A. Control of Entry
A common carrier has the obligation to serve all customers
fairly and equally and hold itself open to the general public for
carriage of people or goods.'" This is the same common-law obliga-
tion which had attached to the nation's railroads. Common carriers
were required to have a certificate from the ICC stating that the
public convenience and necessity required services. The term
"public convenience and necessity" is not defined in the Interstate
Commerce Act. In an early decision, Pan American Bus Lines Op-
9. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
10. Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
11. Dempsey, Entry Control Under the Interstate Commerce Act, 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 729, 735 (1977).
12. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §
1301 (1982)).
13. See generally, 13 AM. JUR. 2D, Carriers § 175 (1964).
1984]
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erations," the ICC established three considerations to be weighed
in determining whether an applicant's proposed operations would
satisfy this criterion:
1. Is there a public demand or need for the service?
2. Can and will this need be served as well by existing carriers?
3. Can the new operation serve the public demand without en-
dangering the operation of existing carriers?15
Professor Paul Dempsey of the University of Denver School of
Law suggests that this test boils down to balancing the advantages
to shippers or passengers of the new motor carriers as opposed to
the actual or potential disadvantages to existing carriers which
might result from the institution of particular shipping
operations.1
An applicant to begin intercity bus service would make an ap-
plication to the ICC, with supporting statements from prospective
passengers or users of package express service. These statements
would testify to a need for the proposed service and willingness to
use it. Usually, the application was protested by existing common
carriers who feared diversion of traffic. Sometimes the application
was amended, after a conference with protestants, to limit the au-
thority sought. In these cases, the protestant might withdraw his
opposition. Even in the absence of opposition, however, the carrier
had to establish a prima facie case of the need of proposed opera-
tions. 1 7 Protestants were required to demonstrate their operating
authority and their willingness and ability to handle the appli-
cant's traffic. The applicant might, in turn, show that population
or business along the route had increased to the extent that there
was enough business for the newcomer as well as existing carriers."
In addition to the public need for the service, the Commission
looked at the services of existing carriers. The Commission im-
posed an affirmative duty on shippers to inform themselves about
which carriers served their routes before they sought additional
motor carriers. But. when a carrier proposed a unique type of
transportation service which existing carriers did not or would not
offer, the ICC often concluded that the public should have the
14. 1 M.C.C. 190 (1936).
15. Id. at 203.
16. Dempsey, supra note 11, at 735.
17. Road Runner Trucking, Inc., Extension-Meat, 124 M.C.C. 245, 248
(1976).
18. Dempsey, supra note 11, at 737.
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benefits of the new service, even if it might divert traffic from ex-
isting carriers.1 The rule at the ICC was to allow existing carriers
to handle the traffic which was within their authorized territory.
The ICC was wary of allowing too many carriers in a market,
for fear of diluting the traffic to the level where no one would sur-
vive. This concern for competitors was limited to motor carrier
protestants. Railroads were unsuccessful in blocking competitive
motor carrier service, since the Commission long believed that pas-
sengers should have the benefits of both modes, wherever possible.
When there had been an increase in traffic, the ICC was more
willing to allow new carriers to serve a market. The last part of the
Pan-American tripartite test was whether or not new carriers
could serve the market without endangering other carriers. Compe-
tition has not been a major factor in ICC considerations until re-
cently. In Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc.,20 the United States Supreme Court decided that the
benefits of competitive service to consumers might outweigh the
discomforts which existing certified carriers could feel as a result of
new entry, and that a policy of facilitating competitive market
structure and performance was entitled to consideration.
The successful applicant would be awarded a certificate of
public convenience and necessity, enabling him to carry passen-
gers, their baggage, packages and newspapers on regular routes.
Until 1967, such a grant also automatically included the right to
operate charter service from on-route points to anywhere in the
United States.
B. Control of Rates
ICC control of rates has been a method of regulating competi-
tion which is as important for stabilizing the structure of the in-
dustry as entry restrictions. Rate regulation of motor carrier ser-
vices is based upon the principles of regulating railroad rates, and
is similar to utility rate regulation. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935
provided as follows:
1. Publication of rates and fares is required and there must be
strict observance of tarrifs.
2. Rates and fares are to be reasonable and not unjustly
discriminatory.
19. Id. at 739. See Kroblin Refrig. Xpress, Inc., Extension-Morrow, 125
M.C.C. 354 (1976).
20. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
1984]
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3. Carrier practices and regulations relating to fares and charges
are to be just and reasonable.
4. Notice of at least 30 days is required for changes in rates and
fares.
5. Proposed rates and fares may be suspended by the Commis-
sion for a period not exceeding seven months.
6. The Commission has power to prescribe the maximum, mini-
mum or actual rate to be charged in lieu of a rate found unrea-
sonable or otherwise unlawful.
7. The Commission has the power to hear complaints and insti-
tute investigations pertinent to its Congressional mandate.2 '
A rate system which avoids fluctuations was believed to pro-
duce solvent carriers and more reliable services. It also makes rates
a predictable matter in figuring transportation costs. Common car-
rier bus companies were required to adhere to the fares and rates
published in their tarriffs filed with the ICC.
Under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, bus fares were essen-
tially carrier-made rates, subject to the approval of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The carrier would initiate a rate by pub-
lishing it in tarriffs which were filed with the Commission between
30 and 45 days before they were to become effective. 2 A protest to
this rate could be made by any interested party, except that a rate
bureau (association of bus companies) could not protest a rate filed
by one of its members. If the Commission agreed that the proposed
rates were reasonable, they could go into effect without an investi-
gation. However, if the Commission decided that the proposal
might result in unlawful rates, it could investigate the rate and
suspend the change. Where a proposed increase was not suspended
but was investigated and later found unlawful, it was ordered can-
celled. The ICC is without power to order refunds of motor carrier
rates.22 After a rate had gone into effect without investigation, pas-
senger and package shippers would challenge its lawfulness by
filing a complaint. If'the rate was found to be unlawful, it could be
cancelled by the ICC.24
21. 0'Neal, Price Competition and the Role of Rate Bureaus in the Motor
Carrier Industry, 10 TRANsP. L.J. 309, 317 (1978).
22. 49 U.S.C. § 10702 (1979).
23. O'Neal, supra note 21, at 320.
24. Id. at 321.
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C. Route Regulation
Generally, bus companies are limited to operation over fixed,
regular routes. The Commission's philosophy seems to have been
that local communities along these lines could thus depend on reg-
ular service by the bus for handling small shipments and passen-
gers, usually on a fixed schedule, every day. There were some devi-
ations allowed: a small town within a mile or two of the designated
route could be served, and trucks or buses could deviate from the
designated highway if a parallelling Interstate highway was built.
(Greyhound and many other intercity bus lines did just that which
resulted in discontinuance of service to small towns once located
on the Greyhounid route). Charter operators did not have to adhere
to regular routes. When a carrier had two separate grants of au-
thority, but both included a single point, the operator could "tack"
the two authorities together through the "gateway" city. Thus, a
carrier who had rights to operate between New Orleans, Louisiana
and Charlotte, North Carolina, and who later acquired authority to
haul between Charlotte and Raleigh, North Carolina, could trans-
port passengers between New Orleans and Raleigh, provided that
he first operated through Charlotte.
D. Fitness
A threshold qualification for any carrier to receive authority
from the ICC is a finding that the carrier is fit, willing and able to
perform properly the proposed service and to comply with the pro-
visions of the Interstate Commerce Act.2 5 The showing of public
need is not enough; there must be some weeding out of carriers
whose conduct demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to per-
form motor carrier operations lawfully. The carrier has the burden
of proof in refuting its prior behavior if it is applying for additional
authority, despite having formerly been in violation of the Act. Fit-
ness concerns the financial capabilities of the applicant, its unwill-
ingness to obey the rules of the Commission, and its ability to
safely and properly perform the proposed services.26
The ICC may grant temporary authority to a motor carrier
while questions relating to fitness are resolved. Temporary author-
ity is a useful device by which the ICC awards operating rights for
25. Dempsey, supra note 11, at 759. See also Dempsey, supra note 11, at 759,
n. 34.
26. Associated Transport, Inc., Extension-TVA Plant, 125 M.C.C. 69 (1976).
1984]
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a limited time while certain conditions prevail. A railroad strike or
natural disaster might result in temporary authority to motor car-
riers to provide increased service to an area. For example, in 1979,
the ICC granted unrestricted temporary authority to intercity bus
operators during a period of acute gasoline shortages.
The scheme contained in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 en-
compassed a broad regulation of activities of intercity motor carri-
ers, similar to government regulation of railroads and, later, air-
lines. Highways may have been built with public money, but their
use was restricted to carriers lucky enough to have received au-
thority from the ICC. Some of the authority was obtained by ap-
plications for certificates of public convenience and necessity, but
many carriers trace their authority to the fact that an ancestor was
driving a bus on the highways in early 1935. Similarly, no rhyme
nor reason existed for the awarding of most authority, which was
fragmented in nature. The original grants of authority coincided
with the routes serviced in 1935. Later grants were awarded when
there was public need and where the competitive balance was not
upset by the new arrival.
V. THE ROAD To DEREGULATION
A. State of the Industry
In 1980, the intercity bus industry was overwhelmingly domi-
nated by Greyhound Lines and, to a lesser degree, by the Trail-
ways system. A series of smaller carriers (Gulf Transit and Jack
Rabbit Lines were among the larger of these) filled the interstices,
most of them living off connecting traffic from the "Big Two."
Greyhound served all 48 contiguous states with a Canadian subsid-
iary providing connections north of the border; Trailways generally
did not venture north or west of Minneapolis. The railroad subsidi-
aries, which once served as a vehicle for diversion of the rails' un-
wanted passenger traffic, had pretty much faded from the scene .2
Because of the companies' policy of letting concessionaires sell
tickets in drug stores, restaurants, etc., bus stations were rudimen-
tary and cheap to operate. Thus, most small towns along major
27. The December 1983 Russell's Bus Guide shows the Bangor & Aroonstook
Railroad as the only railroad still offering bus service along its lines, and few, if
any, train connections listed in the schedules. One of the largest rail subsidiaries,
Gulf Transit, was sold by Illinois Central Industries in the late 1970s. In January,
1984 the I.C.C. allowed Banger & Aroonstook Railroad to discontinue its bus ser-
vice. TRAINS, March 1984.
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highways enjoyed daily bus service in each direction. Labor, costs
were lower than those of rival carriers operating under the Railway
Labor Act 28 because of a lack of competing craft unions and craft
organization of bargaining units. Drivers were required to sell cash
fares en route and to load and unload baggage and express, except
at major company-owned terminals in large cities. As a result, a
lone operator on a bus produced labor savings not possible to pas-
senger trains or airplanes, which required upward of five crew
members.
A regular-route certificate of public convenience and necessity
was virtually always given to applicants seeking to operate an in-
tercity bus. Need for the route had to be established, and protes-
tants mollified. Once granted, the bus company was restricted to a
particular highway or highways and was not allowed to deviate
more than a minimal amount from a prescribed route. The reason
for this rigor was that would-be passengers could station them-
selves along the highway and be assured that sooner or later a bus
would come along to pick them up. A regular route system was
developed which eventually covered, through interconnections, the
entire continental United States, Canada and Mexico. It is now
possible to make a continuous bus journey from Alaska to
Panama.29
The bus network grew from a replacement for branchline pas-
senger trains to a transcontinental network connecting major cities,
usually at lower rates than rail coach. The interurban electric rail-
way fell by the wayside in the 1930's and the bus lines grew at its
expense. The Interstate Highway System enabled buses (until en-
actment of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit) to match passenger
train speeds; unfortunately, it also allowed the buses to bypass
small towns which depended upon them for service.
Buses had more sources of revenue than from intercity passen-
gers. The elimination of less-than-carload-lot rail freight service
and rising less-than-truckload motor freight rates opened a large
market to buses handling package express. Since the ICC certifi-
cates allowed the buses to carry parcels and baggage in the same
28. Rail and air carriers and their employees are regulated by the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1981). Motor carriers under private ownership
come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board by virtue of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1981). Public agencies
operating buses, such as New Jersey Transit, are governed by the appropriate
public employees' collective bargaining law of the involved state.
29. Russell's Bus Guide, December 1983.
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vehicles as the passengers, new double-deck buses were developed
which had increased cargo space. Often the bus company was the
only scheduled freight service to a small community, and a quick
parts shipment business made it possible for local repair shops to
cut inventory. Rates could be lower and service faster than parcel
post, Railway Express, or even United Parcel Service if both the
shipper and the consignee were willing to come to the bus depot to
send and receive their packages.
Another concomitant of the intercity regular-route motor car-
riage of passengers was the opportunity for charter service. In the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 charter operations were included within
the definition of common carriage, and authority to conduct such
trips was routinely included in the grant of authority.30 Once a car-
rier had received authority to serve, for example, Chicago to Min-
neapolis via a certain highway, it also had incidental authority to
conduct charter trips from any point along that route to any other
point within the United States. Many regular-route carriers com-
plained about the loss of charter business when new entrants
sought routes, not because of any potential profitability of regular
service, but because of the opportunity to thereby conduct charter
operations to any point in the country. Congress thereupon
amended Section 208(c) of the Motor Carrier Act in 1966 to re-
quire that any charter authority granted after January 1, 1967 had
to be specifically authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion upon a finding of public convenience and necessity requiring
such charter service. 1
By 1980, the industry was mainly a duopoly, but one that pro-
vided service to every state and most communities of the United
States. However, bus traffic was becoming less popular and the in-
dustry was not as profitable as it might have been. The bus indus-
try did not deliver the mails and thereby serve every small commu-
nity, as is done in Germany, nor did it strive for luxury services
such as are encouraged elsewhere in Europe. Although speed and
comfort had increased, passenger loads were beginning to resemble
those on the railroads in their declining years of passenger service.
More reliance was placed on the charter and express sides of the
market. Some states, such as New Jersey, were entering the market
to provide transportation in the wake of the exit of private carriers
from the state. There were two strong bus systems, but no one was
30. Webb, supra note 5, at 99.
31. Pub. L. No. 89-904, § 208(c), 80 Stat. 1521 (1966).
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thinking of starting a third and few entrepreneurs were hustling to
get into the business.
B. The Competition
1. Airlines
The air carriers received a licensing scheme in 1938 very much
like that of the motor carriers."2 The Civil Aeronautics Authority,
later the Civil Aeronautics Board, determined carriers' routes and
rates and supervised service requirements. A good example of a
regulated oligopoly, the CAB allowed no new airlines to serve
trunk routes from 1938 to 1978.13
Originally it was believed that airlines concentrated on the
long-haul market and buses on the short-haul and that there would
be very little economic, demographic competition between the two
modes. The passenger train was the dominant mode of intercity
public transportation until World War II. The advent of jet planes
of large seating capacity changed the position of air carriers, who
began to seek out others than the luxury class of passengers.
In the 1960's, airlines began to experiment with discount fares.
Particularly aiming their marketing efforts at the newly affluent
group of youthful travelers, the airlines began offering half-fare
standby discounts to young people between 12 and 22. This made
air fare about on a par with bus tariffs, and since the planes trav-
elled 10 times faster than buses, students opted for the skies. The
bus industry complained to the Civil Aeronautics Board, which
found the fares "unjust and unreasonable.""
This utility-type regulation came to an end with the passage
of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978." This law brought about
freedom of entry and route selection as well as ratemaking freedom
to the airline industry, encouraged the growth of low-cost carriers,
and brought about the sunset of the Civil Aeronautics Board at the
32. McCarran-Lea Act, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) as amended by Federal Aviation
Act, Pub. L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970)).
33. Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 11 TRANSP.
L.J. 91, 115 (1979).
34. Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, Phase 5-Discount Fares, C.A.B.
Order 72-12-18 (Dec. 5, 1972). See also Transcontinental Bus System, Inc., v.
C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 481 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
35. Pub. L. No. 95-504 § 2, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1551 (1980).
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end of 1984.1"
The elimination of regulation of the airlines meant that the
intercity bus competed with a deregulated airplane for the city-to-
city traffic. Since only in a few markets (New York-Philadelphia,
Chicago-Milwaukee, New Orleans-Baton Rouge) could the bus
match the plane's downtown-to-downtown time, the plane's advan-
tage became preeminent in long-distance city pairs.
Also, between the major cities, the bus companies were aban-
doning the small towns market. With the completion of the Inter-
state Highway Systems, small towns which had long ago lost rail
passenger service and had never built airports were now losing lo-
cal bus service as well. It was just too much time and trouble to get
off the superhighway to have the bus stop at these places.
2. The Railroads
After World War II, the carriage of passengers and railway ex-
press traffic ceased to be a profit center for the railroads. Interstate
passenger fares were regulated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and after the passage of the Transportation Act of 1958, 3
the discontinuance of rail passenger service became an ICC con-
cern as well.,8 This jurisdiction over interstate passenger trains en-
ded with the establishment of the Amtrak system by virtue of the
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970.39
Amtrak as now constituted is theoretically a private corpora-
tion,'4 0 but it is heavily dependent upon government subsidy. Its
first act in 1971 was to cut in half the number of passenger trains
then operating.41 However, most of the passengers involved took to
the air or to their own private cars and the bus industry did not
receive a large surge of passengers. There have been cutbacks and
extensions of the Amtrak network in the past thirteen years, but
few intermodal arrangements have been made with buses. Bus
companies have generally been unwilling to shorthaul themselves.
In the late 1970's the bus industry made an effort to try to get
36. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (1980).
37. 49 U.S.C. § 10901 (1980). See generally G. HILTON, THE TRANSPORTATION
AcT OF 1958 (1970).
38. Thorns, Regulation of Passenger Train Discontinuances, 22 J. PUB. L.
103 (1973).
39. 45 U.S.C. § 501 et. seq. (Supp. V 1981).
40. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981).
41. See W. THOMS, REPRRmVE FOR THE IRON HORSE, 46-53 (1973).
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Congress to eliminate or sharply curtail the passenger train system,
but since that time the bus industry has muted its criticism and
concentrated instead on getting its own regulatory reform package
through Congress."'
By 1980, the bus industry found itself competing with an un-
regulated and government-subsidized passenger train system on in-
tercity routes. Furthermore, the ICC exempted from regulation
commuter railroads whose trains were subject to the authority of a
State governor.43 (The Long Island Rail Road, the Metro-North
Commuter Railroad, and the New Jersey Transit rail operation
each operate more trains and carry more passengers daily than
Amtrak does). Buses compete head-to-head more with Amtrak
than with state-supported commuter trains, but in both cases the
competition was felt by the bus operators to be unfair. (Except for
a few specialized cases involving ferries-such as in San Francisco
harbor-buses do not face competition from water carriers of pas-
sengers in the United States).
The case for bus deregulation was stated by former ICC Com-
missioner Charles A. Webb:
.... The chief reason given for requiring certificates of public
convenience, citing the railroad experience, was to prevent an
oversupply of transportation. The second most important reason
advanced in the legislative history for controlling entry was to es-
tablish regulatory equality as between unregulated interstate mo-
tor carriers of passengers and regulated passenger carriers, both
rail and motor. Equality of regulation as between rail and motor
carriers of passengers no longer exists since AMTRAK is not sub-
ject to the entry, rate and finance provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Equality of regulation as between intrastate and
interstate motor carriers was a sound objective in 1935 when the
States were responsible for regulating the vast majority of opera-
tions. Since intercity bus transportation is predominantly inter-
state today, it is reasonable to assume that regulatory inequalities
resulting from an easing of federal controls on entry would be al-
leviated by state action or by appropriate language of preemption
in the Federal statute."
42. Phillips, From Anti-Amtrak to Pro-Bus, TRAINS, Jan. 1976, p.6.
43. 49 U.S.C. § 10504 (1980).
44. Webb, supra note 5, at 105.
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3. Trucking Companies.
Buses and trucks were guided by the same regulatory scheme
until 1980. At that time the Motor Carrier Act of 198015 eased, but
did not eliminate, the barriers to entry to new motor freight carri-
ers. One of the principal changes was a shifting of the burden of
proof from applicant to protestant in motor carrier cases." This
made it much easier for trucking companies to get authority to op-
erate over routes already served by a competitor.
Specifically excluded from the liberalizing provisions of the
Motor Carrier Act were the bus companies, which were to operate
for another two years under the 1935 Act. Whatever may be the
benefits of competition, Congress did not feel that the time was
ripe to tinker with America's most comprehensive passenger trans-
portation system.
4. Auto Rentals.
The rental car industry competes in providing transportation
to points served by buses. Usually, the auto rental is much more
expensive and therefore is chosen by business people who need the
convenience of a car and are willing to pay for it. However, on
weekend unlimited-mileage rates it may well be cheaper (particu-
larly if more than one person is traveling) and more convenient to
rent a car than to take the bus. This is because the auto livery
business is essentially a five-day-per-week trade. In order to get
some use out of the cars which otherwise would sit idle in the lot
from Friday afternoon to Monday morning, the competing auto
rental firms are willing to cut rates to whatever will move the cars,
making up any losses on the weekday trade. Buses, on the other
hand, usually charge the same fare every day of the week.
Auto rental firms have generally escaped regulation because,
technically, they are not in the transportation business, but rather
in the car-leasing business. They let you borrow a piece of machin-
ery; what you do with it is your own business. They trade their
pedigree to the livery stables rather than to the sailing ship, steam
engine and stage-coach of the common carriers.
C. Arguments for Deregulation
After the deregulation of rail passenger service, air freight op-
45. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et. seq. (1981).
46. 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(1) (1981).
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erations and the passenger airlines, and after Amtrak and the com-
muter authorities were freed from any vestige of government regu-
lation, and after regulatory controls over rail, water, and motor
freight carriers were eased, transportation economists turned their
attention to the intercity bus companies.
The main reason for considering deregulation of buses was to
place them on equal footing with their competitors. Deregulation
was the stated policy of three administrations and it had its
charms. It enabled politicians to embrace something that promised
both consumer satisfaction and the elimination of a layer of bu-
reaucracy. Deregulation of the other modes had had the support of
both the Congressional left and right.47 This was before any of the
airline or trucking bankruptcies; deregulation was a popular cause,
regulation had few friends. In an era of inflation, deregulation was
hoped to bring down consumer costs and hold down wage settle-
ments. In an era of fuel shortages, deregulation was thought to be
helpful to fuel-efficient buses.
In addition to deregulation, the benefits of competition were
extolled. The industry could stand some shaking up; new appli-
cants (possibly minority businessmen excluded by the old regu-
lated environment) could come forward. Price competition would
drive fares down and force the carriers to be efficient. Customers
could shop around for the best fare or package express rate.
Finally, the flexibility of ease of entry and exit would mean
that the bus could go where the people wanted to without the ne-
cessity for circuitous routes required by tacking.48 Eliminating cir-
cuity would save fuel and ease the energy crunch. During the 1979
fuel crisis following the Iranian hostage-taking, the ICC granted
bus companies temporary authority to serve anywhere in the coun-
try.49 Florida deregulated its entire intrastate motor carrier indus-
47. Thorns, Rollin' On . . . To A Free Market, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 43, 68-69
(1983).
48. Id. at 71. "Tacking" is a means of combining two different authorities by
operating through a common point. It requires, of course, that the vehicle actually
drive through that common point, even though it may be far from the direct route
from origin to destination.
49. Temporary authority is within the ICC's jurisdiction to grant when there
is a strike, interruption of service or other emergency. It was used during the 1979
Iran crisis when it appeared that there would not be enough fuel for private cars,
and when Amtrak was under a government-mandated program to reduce the size
of its network. Trailways was a major beneficiary of this temporary authority pro-
vision. The I.C.C. granted temporary authority again in the Greyhound strike of
1983.
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try, letting the buses pick and choose which routes and communi-
ties they wanted to serve.50 Economists pointed out that the buses,
with inexpensive terminals and using the public roads, carried few
of the indicia of natural monopoly and would best profit in a com-
petitive environment.
D. Buses Are Different
Some critics, including this writer,51 pointed out a few differ-
ences between the bus companies and airlines, rental cars and
other forms of transportation. These differences may have changed
the basis for favoring deregulation.
Rather than having several competing sellers of transporta-
tion, the market nationwide is dominated by the "Big Two"-or
possibly "Big One and One-Half" would be correct, as in some ar-
eas Trailways and the independents are merely the tail to Grey-
hound's "Big Dog."
Arrayed against the duopoly of the bus system are customers
who are in no position to bargain at arm's length. Bus travelers are
often poor people with few alternatives. Many do not own cars.
Many are too young, too old, or to infirm to drive. While the char-
tering party may well have sufficient leverage to bargain with the
bus company, the buyer of a single ticket usually does not; nor
does the small shipper who relies on package express.
Deregulation of air and rail has brought some benefits to the
traveling public, but it also has meant that many cities, towns and
rural areas have lost scheduled service. Now only the bus is left for
the carriage of persons and small shipments. If deregulation
meant, as carriers hoped, that they could exit marginal areas, it
would remove the last means of public transportation giving access
to these towns. Historically protection of these local interests was
the role of state public service commissions, but it was just those
local commissions that the deregulators wished to preempt.5
VI. THE Bus REGULATORY REFORM ACT OF 1982
Complete deregulation was not the prescription Congress or-
dered for the ailing bus lines. Instead, motivated by pressures from
50. Freeman,, Survey of Motor Carrier Deregulation in Florida, 50 I.C.C.
PRAC. J. 51 (1982).
51. Thorns, supra note 47, at 83.
52. Thorns, Administrative Law: Deregulation and Preemption, 1 U.N.D.
FACULTY L.J. 135 (1982).
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bus industry lobbyists who wanted freedom to meet rate competi-
tion and freedom from uneconomic service requirements imposed
by state public service commissions, Congress passed and sent to
President Reagan the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, to bring
a relaxation of economic regulation of the intercity motor bus in-
dustry. The bill was signed into law on September 20, 1982.13
A. Entry-Exit Requirements
With regard to certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity, the new Act is similar to the 1980 trucking law, in that the
Commission is authorized to grant a certificate to any person who
is fit, willing and able to provide intercity bus transportation, un-
less the Commission finds that the transportation is not consistent
with the public interest." The burden of proof has been switched
to protestants. The jurisdiction of the ICC is extended to intra-
state bus service. 55 "Fitness-only" certificates shall be granted to
carriers seeking to serve towns with no existing bus service, or for
service substituting for discontinued passenger train or airline ser-
vice.5" Protests are limited to carriers actually serving the applied-
for route, or those with rival applications.
A rider to the bus deregulation bill prohibits the ICC from
granting certificates for bus or truck service to foreign bus carriers
unless the President has certified that the applicant's country does
not discriminate against United States carriers. This was added in
response to complaints by domestic motor carriers that United
States companies were not being given rights to compete in Cana-
dian and Mexican markets, as those countries had not deregulated
entry to the motor carrier system.57
The Commission has been directed to remove closed-door and
other restrictions from existing certificates held by bus carriers."
Companies may charter a partial load, i.e. handle charter and regu-
lar passengers within the same bus.59
53. Pub. L. No. 97-261 96 Stat. 1102 (1982).
54. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(c)(1)(A) (1983).
55. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(c)(2)(A) (1983).
56. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(c)(4) (1983).
57. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(1) (1983).
58. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(i) (1983).
59. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(j)(2)(A) (1983).
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B. Rate Provision
Antitrust immunity for rate bureaus is to be whittled down by
the Bus Regulatory Reform Act. Since January 1, 1983, rate bu-
reaus have not been allowed to consider any joint rates. An excep-
tion is made for general rate increases or decreases. Carriers are
still required to file tariffs and abide by them; and, the rate bu-
reaus may still publish tariffs, file independent actions for individ-
ual members and provide support services for member carriers.60
A 10% up, 20% down zone of reasonableness is established for
ratemaking by this Act. One year after the effective date of the act
the zone was expanded to 15% increase and 25% decrease and two
years after the law goes into effect, the zone will increase to 20%
up and 30% down. 1 After three years the Commission may not
suspend a rate on the grounds that it is too high or too low.62
C. Preemption of State Authority
A provision of the new law provides that a carrier seeking to
discontinue intrastate service may petition the ICC if the state has
not acted within 120 days of the bus carrier's petition for state
authority to discontinue service. If the state has denied the bus
carrier's request, the carrier may appeal to the ICC." The public
has no such appeal if the state agency grants the request for dis-
continuance. (This procedure is similar to that found in old section
13(a)(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, now 49 U.S.C. 10909, per-
taining to discontinuance of intrastate passenger trains). In addi-
tion, the Commission is authorized to preempt state authority if it
finds 'there is discriminatory state regulation of rates and
practices."
The major provisions of the new bus law provide for greater
freedom to enter markets, flexibility in setting fares, increased
ability to exit markets if the service burdens interstate commerce,
preemption of certain state regulatory controls and the elimination
of antitrust immunity in the determination of rates.
The law also provides for labor protection similar to that af-
forded in the rail and airline industries. Laid-off bus drivers and
60. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10706(e)(3)(E) (1983).
61. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10708(d)(4) (1983).
62. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10708(e) (1983).
63. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10935(a) (1983).
64. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11501(e) (1983).
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other employees are put on a preferential hiring list." No substan-
tial displacement allowances are scheduled to be paid to the for-
mer employees; evidently, Congress already felt stung by the labor
protection costs of the Conrail legislation." Nonetheless, some la-
bor protection provisions were necessary to ensure against labor's
opposition to the deregulation bill. The major opposition was
found in the ranks of legislators from rural states who feared loss
of service to small towns and cities without air or rail passenger
service. These fears are justified. Whereas the old Motor Carrier
Act of 1935 left it to the states to determine the needs of their
citizens for local service, the new Bus Act proclaims that the Com-
mission may overrule a state regulatory agency's ruling applicable
to bus transportation if the ICC finds that the rate or ruling pre-
scribed by a state agency "causes unreasonable discrimination
against or imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate com-
merce."67 The one-sided appeal process for carriers means virtually
unrestrained freedom to exit markets, given the pro-deregulation
tendencies of the current membership of the Interstate Commerce
Commission."
It should be emphasized that what has happened to the bus
industry is not deregulation but reregulation. The Federal govern-
ment has preempted state authority over motor carriage. It is now
easier for a new carrier to gain entry and easier for existing carriers
to offer promotional discount fares or to raise regular rates for its
captive travelers. But the ICC still stands as the ultimate arbiter of
the motor coach industry. It is neither removed from the picture
(as with Amtrak) nor abolished (as with the Civil Aeronautics
Board).
VII. EXPERIENCE SINCE THE Bus ACT
On the face of it, little has changed in the passenger transpor-
tation scene since the passage of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of
1982. Greyhound still dominates the transport scene, with Trail-
ways following a distant second. States have entered the bus busi-
65. Bus Regulatory Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 27, 96 Stat. 1126
(1982).
66. Thorns, What Price Labor Protection?, TRAINS, June 1982, at 47.
67. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11501(e) (1983).
68. See P. DEMPSEY, TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION-ON A COLLISION
COURSE? 38-45 (1983).
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ness, usually in commuter service areas.6 9 Intermodal terminals are
still few and far between, although some through-ticketing between
Amtrak and motor carriers is found.70 The companies seem to have
given up on their fight to curtail Amtrak's activities.7 ' Few inter-
city bus companies serve airports; and commuter airlines, rather
than buses, have been the beneficiaries of the trunk airlines' dis-
continuances of service to smaller cities.
Trailways moved to expand its system in certain areas served
formerly by Greyhound alone, such as upstate New York. Grey-
hound, on the other hand, has used the appeal provisions of the
Act to have the ICC review the decisions of state regulatory au-
thorities which refused to allow the big carrier to discontinue mar-
ginal routes. At least one international route has fallen by the
boards, as Greyhound successfully appealed an unfavorable Minne-
sota Public Service Commission decision to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and has discontinued an East Grand Fork-
Noyes route that formed a vital part of a through Fargo-Winnipeg
line.7 2 In some cases lines abandoned by Greyhound have been
picked up by local operators. Fares have generally risen throughout
the Greyhound system, although some promotional fares have been
offered.
The most dramatic event to follow bus deregulation was not
directly related to the Regulatory Reform law. Greyhound's drivers
struck the system in November 1983, protesting management's
new contract offer which would cut wages more than 10% and shift
the cost of some fringe benefits from the employer to the employ-
ees. The strike, settled 47 days later, was a defeat for the union.7 3
During the strike, Greyhound began partial operations with tem-
porary replacements-but not all over the system. (Service did not
return to North Dakota until shortly before New Year's Eve).
69. New Jersey Transit is now the largest state-owned bus line. In 1984, or-
ders were completed for the largest number of intercity buses from one fac-
tory-Motor Coach Industries of Pembina, N.D. These buses are to be owned by
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and leased to NJ Transit. Grand
Forks Herald, January 12, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
70. Intermodal through rates and routes are the preferred policy of Congress.
See 45 U.S.C.A. § 546(0) (1983).
71. Amtrak's rates now have to meet some type of criterion concerning pas-
senger loss per mile, which meets some of the bus companies' objectives. See, 45
U.S.C.A. § 564(d) (1983).
72. ICC Order MC-1515, Sub. 340 (1983). See TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 21, 1983,
at 19.
73. TRAFFIC WORLD, Nov. 17, 1983, at 34; Id. Nov. 21, 1983, at 19.
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Upon resumption of service, Greyhound offered 1/3 off tickets to be
used on future trips.
Greyhound's actions in reducing its labor costs came on the
heels of a similar effort by Continental Airlines, which had used a
bankruptcy petition as a way of avoiding its collective bargaining
contracts. Greyhound cited reduced-fare competition from the air-
lines as a reason for its actions and said it needed a lower wage
structure to remain competitive in intercity markets.
Temporary authority was given to local carriers to operate
during the strike by the ICC or state public service commissions,7 4
but these carriers by and large ceased operations when Greyhound
was back in business. It is suggested that many of those carriers
derived substantial revenue from their Greyhound connections and
did not care to antagonize the big carrier.
For whatever reason, Greyhound has not faced too much addi-
tional competition due to the relaxed entry provisions of the bus
deregulation law. The situation can be contrasted with the new en-
trants in aviation. Even though a luxury bus costs less than 10% of
the price of an airliner, the skies have been filled with new carri-
ers-from the no-frills service of People Express to the aristocratic
pretensions of luxurious Regent Air. By contract, few new bus liv-
eries are being painted on the sides of the latest models off the
assembly lines at the Motor Coach Industries plant in Pembina,
N.D. Of course, neither airlines nor bus lines have brought forth a
new nationwide system-and many critics of the industry suggest
that the new entrants are apt to do no more than skim the cream
off available traffic.7'
The major means of intercity transportation in the United
States is the private automobile. Without a government policy
favoring a strong intermodal passenger transportation system, the
surface passenger may well regard himself as a second-class citizen.
It is to be hoped that a deregulated bus system will not leave him
bereft of any affordable transportation.
74. Sometimes the new carriers end up having the larger company's un-
wanted service delegated to them. See TRAFFIC WORLD, Jan. 9, 1984, at 26; Tem-
porary Auth. Order, N.D. P.S.C., Nov. 1983.
75. See DEMPsEY, supra note 68, at 27-29.
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